Schmitz, Tet Offensive, Ch. 4-5 (34 pg) (one of the required books)
To guide your reading:
Embarrassingly, my syllabus does not have a day for us to discuss Ch. 3. I do apologize: if I had caught my error any earlier I would have corrected it some other way. I considered cancelling other readings, or having us meet during finals(!) but I have settled on trying to give you the gist of Ch. 3. This means there is some extra reading, but it is better than the alternative…
CHANGE FROM SYLLABUS: selected bits of Ch. 3 AND Ch. 4-5 (43 pg)
84-top of 87: Before the Tet Offensive began, what information did the U.S. (and allies) have about it? What conclusions did they draw?
89-bottom of 90: What were the stated goals of the Tet Offensive in the Hanoi government’s plans?
Short version of the Tet Offensive: In January 1968, North Vietnam attacked more than 100 bases across S. Vietnam. The U.S. inflicted massive casualties on them (10,000 N. Vietnamese casualties vs. 249 U.S. casualties (p. 96)) but the North Vietnamese continued to produce more fighters (103). They also regained control of many rural areas (106), though the U.S. secured most of the major cities after a few weeks of heavy fighting (96).
111-117: What immediate effects did the Tet Offensive have within the U.S.?
Ch. 4: What specific effects did the Tet Offensive have within the U.S. (starting in March 1968, that is, in Chapter 4…)?
Ch. 5: What is the “television thesis” and how does Schmitz attempt to refute it? Do you find his argument convincing?